Thursday, May 31, 2007

regencypacificinc.com surfing the web?

It seems that this web server is surfing the web...
63.236.119.29 resolves to"regencypacificinc.com"
Top Level Domain: "regencypacificinc.com"

Amazon + Nutch again...

Amazon was visiting our sites with Nutch again today.

Amazon scanning my machine again

Why is someone at Amazon scanning my machine with Nutch?

72.44.62.122

ilial/Nutch-0.9 (Ilial, Inc. is a Los Angeles based Internet startup company. For more information please visit http://www.ilial.com/crawler; http://w

OrgName: Amazon.com, Inc.
OrgID: AMAZO-4
Address: Amazon Development Centre South AFrica
Address: 1200 12th Avenue South
City: Seattle
StateProv: WA
PostalCode: 98144
Country: US
NetRange: 72.44.32.0 - 72.44.63.255

Korea Hackers - again

Korea is always a major source of spam and hacking for us.

Today we were bombed by this IP: 222.122.151.181

Looking for PHP hacks.

Wednesday, May 30, 2007

Hmm. ftp.grede.com hacked?

This IP was surfing our web site...

12.34.44.226 resolves to"ftp.grede.com"
Top Level Domain: "grede.com"

Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Google Copied Me

Google copied me. Well they have a bit more resources and some interesting stuff.

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2135462,00.asp

http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/

Monday, May 28, 2007

Hacker activity from 81.223.153.134

inetnum: 81.223.153.128 - 81.223.153.143netname: Technix-Internetdescr:descr: Technix InternetServices GmbHdescr: Wilhelm Pfeiferdescr: Wiencountry: AT

What is YPC 3.2.0

I am finding this in my logs but cannot figure out what it is in a brief web search. Hopefully someone will post some information about it.

serverpronto hacker

Here's a hacker that is blatantly attempting to bypass our bot checking software:

69.60.115.127

Infolink Information Services Inc. INFOLINK-BLK-101 (NET-69-60-96-0-1) 69.60.96.0 - 69.60.127.255Serverpronto INMM-69-60-114-0 (NET-69-60-114-0-1) 69.60.114.0 - 69.60.125.255

In fact you may want to block out all of these:

Serverpronto INMM-69-60-114-0 (NET-69-60-114-0-1) 69.60.114.0 - 69.60.125.255
Serverpronto INMM-69-60-126-0 (NET-69-60-126-0-1) 69.60.126.0 - 69.60.126.255Serverpronto INMM-64-251-14-0 (NET-64-251-14-0-1) 64.251.14.0 - 64.251.14.255Serverpronto INMM-64-251-22-0 (NET-64-251-22-0-1) 64.251.22.0 - 64.251.22.255
Serverpronto INMM-69-60-127-96 (NET-69-60-127-96-1) 69.60.127.96 - 69.60.127.111ServerPronto INMM-64-251-30-0 (NET-64-251-30-0-1) 64.251.30.0 - 64.251.31.255ServerPronto INMM-64-251-25-0 (NET-64-251-25-0-1) 64.251.25.0 - 64.251.25.255ServerPronto INMM-64-251-1-64 (NET-64-251-1-64-1) 64.251.1.64 - 64.251.1.71ServerPronto INMM-69-60-97-64 (NET-69-60-97-64-1) 69.60.97.64 - 69.60.97.71ServerPronto INMM-69-60-110-0 (NET-69-60-110-0-1) 69.60.110.0 - 69.60.110.255ServerPronto INMM-69-60-111-0 (NET-69-60-111-0-1) 69.60.111.0 - 69.60.111.255ServerPronto INMM-64-251-27-0 (NET-64-251-27-0-1) 64.251.27.0 - 64.251.27.255ServerPronto INMM-69-60-109-0 (NET-69-60-109-0-1) 69.60.109.0 - 69.60.109.255Serverpronto INMM-64-251-10-0 (NET-64-251-10-0-1) 64.251.10.0 - 64.251.10.255Serverpronto INMM-69-60-113-0 (NET-69-60-113-0-1) 69.60.113.0 - 69.60.113.255Serverpronto Shared Firewall INMM-64-251-8-0 (NET-64-251-8-0-1) 64.251.8.0 - 64.251.8.255

Thursday, May 24, 2007

Name Intelligence - Bombing our Sites

Some group called Name Itelligence was boming our sites today.

Not to mention that, some code I clearly changed last night was somehow magically reverted by this morning. I am 100% positive someone hacked both my laptop and my server. It doesn't make any sense. I don't know if this bombing by Name Intelligence is related.

OrgName: Compass Communications, Inc. OrgID: CPCMAddress: 2001 6th AvenueAddress: Suite 3205City: SeattleStateProv: WAPostalCode: 98121Country: USNetRange: 64.246.160.0 - 64.246.191.255

Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Related Hacker IPs

There is a good chance that some or all of these IPs are all related hacker IPs (though very possible some are unrelated random internet connections). The reason I say possibly is because all these IPs were blocked by our system in fairly small window:

206.196.111.201
207.8.173.133
66.36.230.11
198.173.15.250
58.61.164.138
209.164.47.89
68.178.25.149
219.72.117.14
206.196.111.201

Sunday, May 20, 2007

Internet Factory - Spain - Looking for a Hack

This IP address: 84.78.106.131

From this network:

inetnum: 84.78.0.0 - 84.79.255.255netname: YACOMNETdescr:descr: Ya.com Internet Factorycountry: es

Was searching Google for the java package that runs our web site.

Log Files Deleted

Someone deleted the log file for web sites yesterday. At least the out-of-the-box log.

Meaning they hacked my web server and were able to edit the contents of a file.

It was most likely one of these IPs - and since it appears an Australian travel related web site was also altered.

67.161.123.184 27 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
66.52.219.150 26 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
202.172.121.86 21 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.1) Gecko/20061204 Firefox/2.0.0.1
70.16.86.239 21 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506)
219.95.201.157 15 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
64.211.119.111 15 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
58.109.25.142 15 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; OptusNetDSL6; FunWebProducts; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.18.133.12 14 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
125.63.220.160 12 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; fr; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
24.19.27.54 12 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.197.234.132 12 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
121.72.139.254 11 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
72.86.23.190 10 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.0.10) Gecko/20070226 Ubuntu/breezy-security Firefox/1.5.0.10
134.7.248.129 10 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
66.212.64.234 9 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.225.232.131 9 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.18.137.119 9 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
151.41.76.15 8 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; InfoPath.1; MEGAUPLOAD 1.0; Mozilla/4.0 (compatible ; MSIE 6
60.234.112.149 8 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
71.231.143.8 8 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
67.53.216.17 7 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; InfoPath.1)
207.190.85.11 7 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1) Gecko/20061010 Firefox/2.0
12.144.142.180 7 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705)
63.83.102.35 7 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.231.138.109 7 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
87.112.66.170 7 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.227.163.15 6 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/312.8.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/312.6
142.167.197.76 6 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
203.33.161.17 6 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
216.41.121.23 6 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.22.183.61 6 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
67.168.63.44 6 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
71.35.174.30 6 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
71.251.36.71 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
76.104.198.212 5 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
76.230.211.202 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 3.1)
86.31.17.9 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.0.106.22 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.161.6.228 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
205.250.69.54 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
12.210.86.95 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
58.168.241.202 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
66.174.92.162 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; (R1 1.5); .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
67.171.26.65 5 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.212.51.10 5 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.212.77.45 4 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/417.9 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/417.8
71.197.194.249 4 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.112.216.207 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30)
71.227.163.15 4 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.212.92.77 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; MSN 9.0;MSN 9.1; MSNbQ002; MSNmen-us; MSNcIA)
71.231.217.113 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
71.231.114.187 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
67.171.29.83 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
67.161.103.218 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
24.19.34.168 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Avant Browser; Avant Browser; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; SpamBlockerUtility 4.8.0)
144.138.23.33 4 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/125.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/125.7
206.196.111.201 4 metatagsdir/0.7 (+http://metatagsdir.com/directory/)
24.12.249.238 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
24.19.50.158 4 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/412.6 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/412.2
82.34.178.59 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.231.0.99 4 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
71.217.78.77 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
71.35.156.246 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; Boeing Kit; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
76.22.52.12 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
64.231.181.163 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
67.170.102.9 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
70.90.186.25 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
66.231.189.97 3 Gigabot/2.0 (http://www.gigablast.com/spider.html)
24.19.23.36 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
24.19.242.5 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
193.72.33.241 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
124.190.88.237 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; FunWebProducts; InfoPath.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
12.72.243.70 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.6) Gecko/20050317 Firefox/1.0.2
24.16.59.122 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
65.102.190.68 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506)
71.231.115.2 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.4) Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1 (ax)
71.121.251.187 3 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.212.81.129 3 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705)
71.196.174.73 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
70.85.114.58 2 Pingdom GIGRIB (http://www.pingdom.com)
68.44.194.30 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
69.156.172.6 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)
69.255.17.229 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
69.37.76.105 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.5) Gecko/20060912 Netscape/8.1.2
76.106.5.101 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
90.242.30.160 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
65.222.176.122 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows XP)
64.124.85.71 2 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; BecomeBot/3.0; +http://www.become.com/site_owners.html)
24.17.245.143 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Windows-Media-Player/10.00.00.3990)
66.235.51.160 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
67.168.95.2 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
68.230.5.189 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
134.7.206.157 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
152.163.100.209 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
192.85.47.2 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.200.116.139 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
216.82.171.6 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
219.206.88.11 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; ja; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
193.35.129.161 2 Opera/9.10 (Windows NT 5.1; U; en)
12.210.182.93 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
203.109.206.194 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
200.122.64.108 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
212.227.83.83 2
207.200.116.132 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.200.116.73 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
209.53.232.173 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
24.18.41.26 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
67.161.125.135 2 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.121.152.254 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
65.222.176.125 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows XP)
84.78.106.131 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
71.231.200.201 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPat
71.35.141.83 2 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; Avant Browser; Avant Browser)
75.92.145.57 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
71.37.27.123 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
72.179.227.82 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
72.254.55.39 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30)
71.240.229.185 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/312.8.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/312.6
71.231.141.255 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506)
71.212.71.48 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506)
80.254.152.84 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20050915 Firefox/1.0.7
81.52.143.16 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; fr; rv:1.8.1) VoilaBot BETA 1.2 (http://www.voila.com/)
76.205.101.176 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
66.180.82.87 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
66.231.188.133 1 Gigabot/2.0 (http://www.gigablast.com/spider.html)
64.235.108.248 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
65.214.39.180 1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9a1) Gecko/20070308 Minefield/3.0a1
24.22.209.95 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
24.22.218.197 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.8) Gecko/20051111 Firefox/1.5
60.191.80.224 1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; YodaoBot/1.0; http://www.yodao.com/help/webmaster/spider/; )
62.194.15.193 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
64.12.116.19 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705)
64.12.116.5 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
64.124.85.76 1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; BecomeBot/3.0; +http://www.become.com/site_owners.html)
64.124.85.77 1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; BecomeBot/3.0; +http://www.become.com/site_owners.html)
71.13.115.117 1 bot/1.0 (bot; http://; bot@bot.bot)
71.102.99.173 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
71.168.130.247 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.172.236.42 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.197.164.190 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; FunWebProducts; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPath.1)
66.249.85.85 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
66.36.230.11 1
67.40.25.45 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
210.82.118.14 1 favorstarbot/1.0 (+http://favorstar.com/bot.html)
207.200.116.200 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
216.131.91.205 1
24.11.108.250 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.174.106.137 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPath.1)
24.18.137.235 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.18.230.83 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.18.246.181 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
24.18.246.185 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
207.200.116.12 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
203.76.128.203 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
195.4.221.251 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; de; rv:1.8.1.2) Gecko/20070219 Firefox/2.0.0.2
12.144.142.180 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
152.163.100.76 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
159.226.26.99 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
18.194.1.206 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
193.227.227.54 1 nsjmfiurhgrkisulbfmixiholgk ecylus6oi
24.115.225.223 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
24.136.66.146 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
24.16.23.32 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
204.130.228.90 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
206.183.1.74 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; T-H-U-N-D-E-R-S-T-O-N-E)
216.160.92.13 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.200.116.202 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.200.116.8 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.200.116.9 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
207.216.51.61 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; Media Center PC 4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30; InfoPath.1)
206.80.1.253 1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9a1) Gecko/20070308 Minefield/3.0a1
207.115.68.99 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
207.200.116.137 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
193.35.129.169 1 Opera/9.10 (Windows NT 5.1; U; en)
193.95.154.69 1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9a1) Gecko/20070308 Minefield/3.0a1
195.60.64.5 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pl; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
202.191.106.20 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)
203.220.203.253 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.5) Gecko/20041217
159.226.26.98 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
190.42.83.216 1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20061201 Firefox/2.0.0.3 (Ubuntu-feisty)
142.68.80.30 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Hotbar 4.5.0.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
144.132.94.218 1 Xenu Link Sleuth 1.2i
125.253.35.241 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
68.32.23.202 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
67.183.147.21 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.3
67.183.220.214 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
67.184.3.163 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
66.24.105.4 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
66.194.6.68 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Q312469)
64.27.29.45 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible ; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
24.18.186.147 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
24.18.241.84 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; (R1 1.5); .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
24.20.208.213 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 3.1)
64.124.85.73 1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; BecomeBot/3.0; +http://www.become.com/site_owners.html)
64.124.85.79 1 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; BecomeBot/3.0; +http://www.become.com/site_owners.html)
64.12.117.5 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; AOL 9.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
65.222.176.123 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows XP)
65.243.153.100 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
81.219.27.49 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
82.154.42.127 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pt-BR; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
83.116.238.30 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; nl; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070309 Firefox/2.0.0.3
89.180.32.129 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; InfoPath.1)
71.97.249.48 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; IEMB3; InfoPath.1; IEMB3)
72.79.234.67 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
72.88.201.176 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.216.15.25 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.217.106.179 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
71.227.164.19 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
69.91.157.132 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en-US; rv:1.8.0.11) Gecko/20070312 Firefox/1.5.0.11
70.215.92.151 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
70.83.131.206 1 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20061201 Firefox/2.0.0.3 (Ubuntu-feisty)
69.29.198.44 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
68.84.228.60 1 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/419 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3
71.101.61.14 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; Media Center PC 4.0)
71.197.235.80 1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)

Sunday, May 13, 2007

Naval Surface Warfare Center - connected to/from my laptop?

This is odd. I'm logged into a VPN to a remote server and suddenly my terminal services connection is locking up. I check IPs I am connected to and there's the Google Toolbar notifier so I shut it off. Then my machine seems to free up and I can move the mouse around on the remote server again. But I think that was a coincidence. Shortly thereafter lock up again on my administrator account on the remote machine via Terminal Services. Another look at the IPs my machine is connected to reveals a connection to two Naval Surface Warfare Center IPs on port 80. I have no reason to be connected to these IP addresses. As far as I know I am only connected to my own web server, through the web on port 80, and through a VPN so how the heck is my machine somehow connecting to the these addresses on port 80???

128.38.52.46 and 128.38.52.34

OrgName: Naval Surface Warfare Center OrgID: NSWC-1Address: 17320 Dahlgren RoadAddress: Code XDTCity: DahlgrenStateProv: VAPostalCode: 22448-5000Country: USNetRange: 128.38.0.0 - 128.38.255.255

Friday, May 11, 2007

Organized Crime and Hacking

This article says people are "wondering" if organized crime is involved in hacking.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/050907-fbi-organized-crime-cybercrime.html?nlhtsec=0507securityalert5&

DUH. Obviously this person doesn't know much about what they are writing about.

What is organized crime anyway? Is it organized when someone has a bunch of command and control bots or when there is a whole row of computers in a hut in Nigeria working on money transfer schemes from stolen funds using people who fall for their ploys?

Maybe they only mean a certain type of organized crime - Mafia. Given that the Internet is the absolute easiest way to make a whole tone of money without killing anyone or counting on too many people to get the job done, I would venture to say that any smart criminal organization would be after that pot of gold.

But the flip side of that is the Internet is all about computers and data. Computers don't lie. If the data is tracked by a really smart programmer on the other side of the fence - the good guys will have the data they need to nab the crooks much faster than traditional walking the street and trying to find scared witnesses to testify who are afraid for their lives.

OK maybe I've been watching too many cops and robbers and lawyer movies lately. But I can totally see the possibilities here and it's pretty much been reported already that certain criminal and terrorist organizations are involved in Internet crimes.

Wednesday, May 09, 2007

Good and Bad File Security From Microsoft

Microsoft seems to have a policy where you can set high security on your computer and block files that came from another computer from running. To unblock you right click on the file and choose unblock and the file can run.

Great. But what about when you download and run a program from the Internet and it has a whole bunch of files required to run and you try to run the app and get cryptic error messages and have no idea what the problem is or which file to unblock even if you do know what the problem is...this is typical Microsoft. When you change settings in your OS it can cripple and even corrupt your OS at times if you change COM and DCOM settings the wrong way.

But even worse I cannot get my work done right now (and had to stop and gripe about it) because this lovely security mechanism has blocked me from uncompressing a zip file. So yeah I turned around and unblocked it - cool, right? Not cool. When I try to unzip it still doesn't work and I am guessing it is because all the files in the zip file came from another computer - and I cannot "unblock" them because they are in a zip file! If that is not the problem not sure what is.

So I like the concept but I don't like the implementation. It would be better to allow someone to see all the files that ran, have run and are running and click on something to see what program they are associated with, which user ran them, time, date, etc. Also it needs to be easy to globally turn on and off this blocking and include those intstructions with the instructions for unblocking a file.

Wednesday, May 02, 2007

Googlebot.com surfing for PHP files?

We got a hit for a php file we don't host. Turns out the IP resolves to googlebot.com. However the bot does not identify itself as Google in the user agent so it looks suspcious. But..when I go to googlebot.com in a browser...it goes to google. What is up with that?

Thursday, April 26, 2007

Keyloggers in Keyboards

Looks like keyloggers can be implanted in keyboards. Is that why my toshiba laptop keeps croaking? It somehow wants to always type extra letters.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/080806-keyboard.html?nwwpkg=alphadoggs

For Starbucks and Tmobile - Hotspot Hacks

I don't think this is all that new. I typically am on a VPN at a hotpsot (though there have been times when I wondered if someone could still access my machine).

Anyway when will the day come that someone gets hacked at Starbucks and turns around and sues them. I don't know how that would work out. I don't know if there is anything Starbucks or Tmobile can do about this (just naming the big guys here) but they certainly should try.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/042507-infosec-evil-twin-wi-fi-access.html?nlhtsec=0423securityalert4&company=HP

DNS Server Hacks

I don't know how many times I suggested that potentially DNS was hacked to various companies where weird things were happening....and they blew me off like I was nuts. Like there's no way DNS can be hacked. Right.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/041307-dns-vulnerability.html?nlhtsec=0416securityalert1&company=Mu%20Security

The question is, what's the fastest way to pinpoint if your DNS server is hosed?

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Related PHP hacker IPs

The following are related hacker hits trying to access PHP pages. These IPs are related as the hits all came at the same time.

"inetnum: 59.88.0.0 - 59.99.255.255
netname: BSNLNET
descr: NIB (National Internet Backbone)
descr: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
descr: Sanchar Bhawan,20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001
country: IN
" 299391 BLOCKED 9jdq30c0otrp Tue Apr 24 04:59:02 PDT 2007 59.94.208.172 /index.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /index.php act=Reg&CODE=00 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:59:03 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:59:03 AM
"inetnum: 59.88.0.0 - 59.99.255.255
netname: BSNLNET
descr: NIB (National Internet Backbone)
descr: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
descr: Sanchar Bhawan,20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001
country: IN
" 299391 BLOCKED 9jdq30c0otrp Tue Apr 24 04:59:02 PDT 2007 59.94.208.172 /index.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /index.php act=Reg&CODE=00 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:59:03 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:59:03 AM
"Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. ATT-COMCAST (NET-71-192-0-0-1)
71.192.0.0 - 71.207.255.255
Comcast Cable Communications, IP Services WASHINGTON-16 (NET-71-197-128-0-1)
71.197.128.0 - 71.197.255.255
" 299389 BLOCKED 3bghs2pqv3ms4 Tue Apr 24 04:58:56 PDT 2007 71.200.172.74 /index.php /index.php act=Reg&CODE=00 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:58:56 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:58:56 AM
299388 BLOCKED 1cabokzq2eon9 Tue Apr 24 04:58:55 PDT 2007 200.140.12.1 /register.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /register.php action=signup&who=adult 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:58:56 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:58:56 AM
299387 BLOCKED 5bntk8b5n6k1t Tue Apr 24 04:58:52 PDT 2007 58.142.79.54 /register.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /register.php action=signup&who=adult 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:58:52 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:58:52 AM
299386 BLOCKED b2idleeknprcn Tue Apr 24 04:58:51 PDT 2007 201.12.150.239 /profile.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /profile.php mode=register 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:58:51 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:58:51 AM
299385 BLOCKED 5k5ov71rsp1qd Tue Apr 24 04:58:47 PDT 2007 203.223.150.95 /profile.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /profile.php mode=register 83 7 1 4/24/2007 4:58:48 AM 24 4 4/24/2007 4:58:48 AM

University of Minnesota bot

We just got a whole slew of hits much too fast for a normal user from this network and IP:

134.29.227.130

OrgName: Minnesota State University System OrgID: MSUSAddress: Wells Fargo PlaceAddress: 30 7th Street East, Suite 350City: St. PaulStateProv: MNPostalCode: 55101-7804Country: USNetRange: 134.29.0.0 - 134.29.255.255

This was in the user agent - not sure if related: knst2007

I can find no references to this on Google except that it's showing up on web stats reports - specifically for a lot of Univerisities.

Monday, April 23, 2007

nflplayers.com surfing the web

This web server is visiting our web sites:

66.208.26.98 resolves to"nflplayers.com"
Top Level Domain: "nflplayers.com"

iibee.com browsing web sites

This IP address points to iibee.com and seems to be a computer used to surf the web. Is this a web server or someone trying to host a site from their basement? Why is it surfing the web?

216.194.68.120 resolves to"iibee.com"Top Level Domain: "iibee.com"

ap-art.com surging the web

Here's a web server that is being used to surf our web sites:

207.234.208.96 resolves to"ap-art.com"Top Level Domain: "ap-art.com"

liggins.plus.com - surfing the web?

Hmm, should this IP address be surging the web? Seems to have an interest in our web sites.

212.159.42.175 resolves to"liggins.plus.com"
Top Level Domain: "plus.com"

turbinegenerator.com surfing the web

This ip resolves to turbinegenerator.com - seems a web server is surfing the web.

209.34.233.62 resolves to"turbinegenerator.com"
Top Level Domain: "turbinegenerator.com"

proxyout.utah.gov

Why is this proxy server for the utah government surfing our web sites? Is this a typical configuration? It could be I'm not sure.

204.113.19.8 resolves to"proxyout.utah.gov"Top Level Domain: "utah.gov"

proxy2.xter.net

Proxy server surfing our web sites?

83.217.229.147 resolves to"proxy2.xter.net"
Top Level Domain: "xter.net"

knsk.de

Here's a web server surfing our web sites...

212.1.49.129 resolves to"knsk.de"
Top Level Domain: "knsk.de"

F5 wants to secure your apps with their network hardware

Here's an interesting approach to application security from F5 Networks using their Big IP device (which was insanely expensive last time I checked):

http://www.f5.com/solutions/technology/securing_enterprise_wp.html?CMP=KNC-GoogSiteNtwk&gclid=CLuEguDO2IsCFQQRYwodll4haw

The only issue I see here is more complicated application testing and debugging. It will be harder to pinpoint errors.

I haven't thought it totally through and it's late but seems like this is a network device and should focus on network issues.

The concept of what they are doing should be done by every application however and perhaps and application framework is best suited for these things. Perhaps you could use a combination but I worry about the maintenance consequences of this.

A web server surfing the web

63.144.222.2 resolves to"www.hardeecounty.net"
Top Level Domain: "hardeecounty.net"

Sunday, April 22, 2007

Inquent = hacked?

Working away here suddenly my printer started making noise for no apparent reason. I'm guessing someone got on my network or my machine here and they are snooping around and hit the device on that port / local IP.

I looked at IPs my machine is connected to and for no apparent reason it is connected to this IP:

205.178.145.1

InQuent Technologies Inc. INQUENT-2 (NET-205-178-128-0-1) 205.178.128.0 - 205.178.191.255Network Solutions, LLC NSLLC01 (NET-205-178-145-0-1) 205.178.145.0 - 205.178.145.255

Hmmm....hacked or?

Thursday, April 19, 2007

Microsoft DNS + RPC vulnerability

And if you didn't believe me that DNS can be hacked and send you to the wrong place (as suggested in the last post about an ebay web site issue) read this:

http://securitywatch.eweek.com/exploits_and_attacks/microsoft_urges_workaround_as_worm_hits_unpatched_dns_flaw.html?kc=EWEWEMNL041807EP38A

A flaw in or explotation of the implementation of the Microsoft DNS service plus RPC (remote procedure call) service is being abused.

JavaScript hacks

Here's an interesting article on JavaScript hacks. This would apply to people going to web sites that have the attacks in the code when you download the page and the inability of various virus, malware and spybot type software figuring out that the code is actually malicious.

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2115638,00.asp?kc=EWEWEMNL041907EP38A

Ebay site problem

Ebay has a page where you can enter a whole bunch of information if you forget your password.

There is a whole host of sensitive information you have to enter on that page to get your password.

The page is only accessible via http.

Oh but they probably submit it via https you say.

So what. Let's say their DNS gets hacked someone and people set up a fake page at that address on the servers that are being rerouted to when you think you're at ebay. The only way to know you are really at ebay is hitting the page via https because the certificate applies to a specific server. Without that you can be rerouted and when you hit submit on this bogus link you just gave a hacker your secret question/answer (which you probably used in multiple places, right?), your birth date, place of birth, etc. etc.

Scary.

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Encoding vs. Encryption

I was working on a site that encodes cookies today and I was wondering why they did that. I was thinking that "hey, encoding is not the same as encrypting...are they doing this for security reasons?" Then I started thinking about it a little more - the distinction between encrypting and encoding. I did a quick search which provided a nice document that I am giving kudos to for backing up my thoughts on the technically correct purposes of encode and encrypt.

http://www.di-mgt.com.au/encode_encrypt.html

Friday, April 13, 2007

195.10.45.155

Here's an interesting dns resolution. Hide? Hmm.

195.10.45.155 resolves to"hide-155.nhs.uk"
Top Level Domain: "nhs.uk"

Tuesday, April 10, 2007

A surfing hosting proxy server

This IP was surfing our web sites. Looks like something good to block.

203.97.46.29 resolves to"proxy.hosting.co.nz"
Top Level Domain: "co.nz"

Websherpas.com hacked?

Hmm, websherpas.com needs to consult a higher power to prevent their server from surfing the web. This server was sniffing around our web sites:

209.102.67.2 resolves to"www.websherpas.com"
Top Level Domain: "websherpas.com"

Romania, China, Russia...

Hmm, suddenly I am getting loads of hits from Romania, China and Russia. This after a recent article I posted suggested the US as the malware capital of the world and my suggestion that the actual source of this hacking is elsewhere. I also suggested segmenting your servers for different parts of the world and known hacker countries so that hacker sources are limited to hacking their own boxes and not the rest of the boxes used by countries in the world that are not such a high percentage of Internet theives, crooks, criminals and spies (though we all have some black sheep in our family).

212.20.253.212 resolves to"euro-hostels.co.uk"

This is another web server surfing our web site. Probably hackers or hacked.

212.20.253.212 resolves to"euro-hostels.co.uk"
Top Level Domain: "co.uk"

wmanet.org surfing our web site

Hmm. Another web server surfing our web site.

216.195.194.210 resolves to"wmanet.org"
Top Level Domain: "wmanet.org"

Saturday, April 07, 2007

209.51.147.66 - Monitoring will not stop

This Ip continues to monitor our site and will not stop. Hopefully Global Net Access will look into the activities coming from this IP Address.

IPs used by same hacker(s)

Just a hunch but these IPs are probably all used by the same hacker and/or hacked servers:

221.147.153.67
203.162.3.15674.52.245.146
220.123.254.200

Friday, April 06, 2007

209.51.147.66 - HACKER

This IP either belongs to a hacker or is being used by a hacker. They bombed our site today.

Check your logs for this one...especially those in the travel industry.

Korean Hackers Are Stepping Up

In the past few days we got a number of hacker scans from Korea. We block a lot of bad ranges but suddenly they are picking up again.

Here are a few of the IP ranges:

inetnum: 125.176.0.0 - 125.191.255.255netname: XPEEDcountry: KR

inetnum: 211.104.0.0 - 211.119.255.255netname: KRNIC-KRdescr: KRNICdescr: Korea Network Information Centercountry: KR

inetnum: 211.104.0.0 - 211.119.255.255netname: KRNIC-KRdescr: KRNICdescr: Korea Network Information Centercountry: KR

inetnum: 220.88.0.0 - 220.95.255.255netname: KORNETdescr: KOREA TELECOMdescr: Network Management Centercountry: KR

inetnum: 211.104.0.0 - 211.119.255.255netname: KRNIC-KRdescr: KRNICdescr: Korea Network Information Centercountry: KR

inetnum: 211.104.0.0 - 211.119.255.255netname: KRNIC-KRdescr: KRNICdescr: Korea Network Information Centercountry: KR

inetnum: 218.144.0.0 - 218.159.255.255netname: KORNETdescr: KOREA TELECOM

inetnum: 218.234.0.0 - 218.239.255.255netname: HANANETdescr: Hanaro Telecom Co.descr: Kukje Electornics Cneter Bldg. 1445-3 Seocho-Dong Seocho-Kucountry: KR

inetnum: 222.96.0.0 - 222.122.255.255netname: KORNETdescr: KOREA TELECOMdescr: Network Management Centercountry: KR

inetnum: 58.224.0.0 - 58.239.255.255netname: HANANETcountry: KR

A string of related PHP hacker IPs

Here are a string of hits in a row from IPs in different parts of the world requesting things that are not on our server. They are requesting a specific URL, not an IP address so this is not a DNS problem where someone pointed a domain to our IP by mistake. I believe our DNS servers are set up correctly as I just double checked everything but my hosting company has a propensity for screwing up DNS records so will have to check that again. However given what they are requesting I assume these are a bunch of related hacked IPs, probably controlled by a command and control bot somewhere.

"inetnum: 220.0.0.0 - 220.63.255.255
netname: BBTECH
descr: Japan nation-wide Network of SOFTBANK BB CORP
descr: Tokyo, Japan
country: JP
" 269236 BLOCKED 7i1768n6s9ky Thu Apr 05 07:10:31 PDT 2007 220.125.98.46 /index.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /index.php act=Reg&CODE=00 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:31 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:31 AM
"inetnum: 218.144.0.0 - 218.159.255.255
netname: KORNET
descr: KOREA TELECOM
" 269235 BLOCKED 1n2q7vj1sj66u Thu Apr 05 07:10:28 PDT 2007 218.144.144.230 /index.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /index.php act=Reg&CODE=00 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:29 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:29 AM
269234 BLOCKED 17fot0jc7s1g6 Thu Apr 05 07:10:26 PDT 2007 218.239.91.102 /register.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /register.php action=signup&who=adult 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:27 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:27 AM
269233 BLOCKED 884p8rgc0r4b Thu Apr 05 07:10:24 PDT 2007 222.99.104.139 /register.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /register.php action=signup&who=adult 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:25 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:25 AM
269232 BLOCKED g6t4qf5acgdc9 Thu Apr 05 07:10:22 PDT 2007 58.226.121.105 /profile.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /profile.php mode=register 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:23 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:23 AM
"inetnum: 59.88.0.0 - 59.99.255.255
netname: BSNLNET
descr: NIB (National Internet Backbone)
descr: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
descr: Sanchar Bhawan,20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001
country: IN
" 269231 BLOCKED 1q0g62wvk2a4 Thu Apr 05 07:10:18 PDT 2007 59.93.209.25 /profile.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /profile.php mode=register 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:18 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:18 AM
"inetnum: 59.88.0.0 - 59.99.255.255
netname: BSNLNET
descr: NIB (National Internet Backbone)
descr: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
descr: Sanchar Bhawan,20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001
country: IN
" 269231 BLOCKED 1q0g62wvk2a4 Thu Apr 05 07:10:18 PDT 2007 59.93.209.25 /profile.php Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.3a) /profile.php mode=register 83 7 1 4/5/2007 7:10:18 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 7:10:18 AM

Another php attack - XMLRPC.PHP etc.

If you are running php and using any of the files below beware - there is probably some sort of hack in them. This attack comes from 61.62.83.165

Surprise, surprise - Taiwan.

inetnum: 61.62.0.0 - 61.62.255.255netname: SONET-NETcountry: TW

Taiwan is a big hacker source. If you're not doing business there you may want to consider blocking out IPs from this country. If you're not getting any money from Taiwan the only thing you will get is a bunch of problems.

269083 BLOCKED 5dmervkrad0bs Thu Apr 05 00:29:54 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /phpgroupware/xmlrpc.php /phpgroupware/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM
269082 BLOCKED 1gpe1xqetqxi1 Thu Apr 05 00:29:54 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /phpgroupware/xmlrpc.php /phpgroupware/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM
269081 BLOCKED 4famei5pnqlkj Thu Apr 05 00:29:53 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /wordpress/xmlrpc.php /wordpress/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM
269080 BLOCKED 48978s37c7mpo Thu Apr 05 00:29:53 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /wordpress/xmlrpc.php /wordpress/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:54 AM
269079 BLOCKED 9ur4s0tv5oqc Thu Apr 05 00:29:53 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /b2evo/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php /b2evo/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM
269078 BLOCKED 2rkqne24ojvle Thu Apr 05 00:29:53 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /b2evo/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php /b2evo/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM
269077 BLOCKED vt6xth4n6s0r Thu Apr 05 00:29:52 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /b2/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php /b2/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM
269076 BLOCKED qiox5oyth034 Thu Apr 05 00:29:52 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /b2/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php /b2/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:53 AM
269075 BLOCKED e7ecb4966qpr7 Thu Apr 05 00:29:52 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /blogtest/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php /blogtest/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php 83 7 1 4/5/2007 12:29:52 AM 5 4 4/5/2007 12:29:52 AM
269074 BLOCKED 12ncmocu7lv5a Thu Apr 05 00:29:52 PDT 2007 61.62.83.165 /blogtest/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php

Wednesday, April 04, 2007

Charter bot is back

Will it ever give up or will Charter ever do something about this bot...

Charter - bot/1.0 (bot; http://; bot@bot.bot) 267331 BLOCKED 2t10omfv05mc Wed Apr 04 07:58:34 PDT 2007 71.13.115.117 bot/1.0 (bot; http://www.bot.bot; bot@bot.bot) 83 7 1 4/4/2007 7:58:35 AM 4 4 4/4/2007 7:58:35 AM

IPs that need to be updated

Here are some interesting results looking up the information about this IP range:

inetnum: 156.54.0.0 - 156.54.255.255

remarks: This inetnum has been transfered as part of the ERX. It was present in both the ARIN and RIPE databases, so the information from both databases has been merged. If you are the mntner of this object, please update it to reflect the correct information.

Tuesday, April 03, 2007

Comcast needs to fix this domain name

This domain name information is not correct ... MN needs to be changed:

24.18.46.154 resolves to"c-24-18-46-154.hsd1.mn.comcast.net"
Top Level Domain: "comcast.net"

An exchange sever perhaps?

If this is an Exchange server what is it doing surfing our web sites?

Perhaps this stands for something else however:

64.65.150.210 resolves to"exch.seattlearch.org"
Top Level Domain: "seattlearch.org"

Bank Server surfing?

Here's a bank server in Sweden surfing the web....is this right? That's a little scary...but perhaps since I don't speak the language this is referring to a modem bank..so I'll let it slide for now =)

195.242.56.2 resolves to"clients.kaupthing.se"
Top Level Domain: "kaupthing.se

Funny looking domain resolution for a web surfer...

This one looks a little funny ...is this really the IP of an end user surfing or a server?

128.250.172.175 resolves to"guyd.psych.unimelb.edu.au"
Top Level Domain: "edu.au"

Another surfing web server? william.aeoncyberclub.com

Here's an IP with an interesting resolution:

202.7.145.118 resolves to"william.aeoncyberclub.com"
Top Level Domain: "aeoncyberclub.com"

Is this really a machine surfing the web or a human?

www.adressendeutschland.de web server surfing our web sites

This server appears to be surfing the web and appears to be a web server, though by the looks of the "site" it may be an amateur at home hosting his or her own site.

88.198.38.230 resolves to"www.adressendeutschland.de"
Top Level Domain: "adressendeutschland.de"

ozemail.com.au surfing the web

Is this really an email domain or a dsl domain? It says ozemail but then it has dsl in the URL as well. Hopefully someone in Australia can alert this email / dsl provider to find out if this server is hacked.

203.102.242.189 resolves to"189.fip-4.dsl.ozemail.com.au"
Top Level Domain: "com.au"

km6.favo.tv -- a computer user?

This Ip was hitting our site - not sure if this is part of a DSL network - a router or other networking equipment -or something totally not legitimate.

87.118.100.27 resolves to"km6.favo.tv"
Top Level Domain: "favo.tv"

A proxy server in the Phillipines

Here's a proxy server in the Philippines surfing around our web sites...

202.44.136.50 resolves to"proxy.thapra.su.ac.th"
Top Level Domain: "ac.th"

Speak Easy "scan alert" server surfing our sites?

A SpeakEasy IP with some scanalert.com application is surfing our web sites...

66.92.26.98 resolves to"scan0.scanalert.com"
Top Level Domain: "scanalert.com"

EntireWeb surfing our webs

Here's another web server IP address surfing our web sites. This is a search engine optimization company so chances are they are analyzing our sites to snipe content and/or copy our ranking techniques. I suggest you block this one out.

62.13.25.221 resolves to"www.entireweb.com"
Top Level Domain: "entireweb.com"

Monday, April 02, 2007

A web server surfing our web sites

Here's a web server surfing our web sites:

209.180.210.90 resolves to"sightlife.org"Top Level Domain: "sightlife.org"

Saturday, March 31, 2007

Favorstar.com

We keep getting hits from favorstar.com. I boldly and probably riskily went to this site and it's a Chinese site with some video and half naked women on it in bras, etc. Whatever this site is up to, it can't be any good. I also noticed they are advertising a t-shirt site in direct competition with one of ours. I can't imagine this site is up to anything good.

Wednesday, March 28, 2007

U.S. Malware Capital?

This article form Network World claims that San Jose found the most malware was hosted in the US "contrary to the belief that it was coming from other countries" not in so many words.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/032607-more-evidence-of-us-as.html?nlhtsec=0326securityalert3&company=MessageGate

They almost downplay the issue that most of this malware is probably weaseled onto servers via hacking or on servers paid for by people of origin outside the U.S. Yes, there are probably a lot of US hackers - we did invent the computer after all.

It is important to keep all factors in mind while analyzing this topic. It has also been reported that many hacker and terrorist organizations buy computer networking from the US because it is more cost effective (or was) than in other countries. That may be changing with China and India in the game, I'm not sure.

Hacked servers are also a huge source of this malware and I would be interested to know the % of this 80% of malware that is on hacked servers and how much of the malware actually got onto the US computers via a hack from someone originating from another country. A person I spoke to from the FBI says about 15% of the world's computers are thought to be "command and control bots," meaning they are either set up intentionally or hacked to run code for someone who is using a command server to control a bunch of other machines to carry out their dirty work.

The author did mention the money changing hands here - and why the US is a target, but also consider that the UK is second on the list. The US, the UK. Hmmm.

Also to take into consideration would be the size of the US and the amount of computers in the US relative to other countries. I'm not sure but I'd guess there are a relatively larger number of computers here than in some other countries at this time.

But perhaps the author just meant that this is where most of the malware is running - that the U.S. is the target and our security is totally lacking, rather than highlighting the US as a source of creating and distributing malware. If you consider the malware is running on machines that can affect people all over the world it is a problem - but the cause of that problem still may be mainly coming from outside the US. Security lacking? A wake up call? With that I would have to agree.

Personally I find plenty of hacker looking traffic from all over the world. I haven't done the numbers to compare by country but there are a load of hackers in Ontario, Alaska, throughout Europe, and a ton coming out of Asia - especially China and Taiwan. There is some that comes out of Brazil and occasionally Mexico - I was bombed by France the other day (see a recent post).

The interesting thing is that probably one of the biggest hacks on credit cards at Card Service International (I believe that is correct) in Arizona a couple years ago was attributed to the Russian Mafia by the news in Australia when I was down there. People in the US said they didn't hear that - I am not sure what was reported in the US.

But I get very little hacker like traffic from Russia. Does that mean there are no hackers in Russia? No, it means they are pretty damn smart. They do their dirty work from hacked servers in other parts of the world so they are not discovered. A recent piece of malware running on tons of US servers included a built in virus checker - Kapersky - Russian by origin though they since tried to appear as they are headquartered in the US. I also think there may be some Russian hackers up in Alaska using some network - Hideout.net

So the point the author is making about most of the hacks not coming from Russia or China like everyone thinks - is twisting the facts.

RufusBot is a Dufus. 64.124.122.228

The so-called "rufus bot" is hitting us repeatedly again from this IP address: 64.124.122.228 and the stupid thing is, it is requesting pages that do not exist on our server over and over again and getting Page Not Found errors and still continues to request the pages.

Either the person that wrote the RufusBot is a dufus, or as I suggested before there is an error related to 404 errors that present a security or hacker problem. I am not sure why else these bots would try to hit pages that do not exist repeatedly. I guess they could be that stupid, but I kind of doubt it.

Saturday, March 24, 2007

Hackers - Ontario

I am still convinced there are hackers in Ontario - probably on Rogers Cable but also coming from Shaw and other networks. I think they move around.

After implementing a new filter we just got a bunch of hits in a row on pages without referrers from Toronto IPs.

Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Ask Jeeves Spoofer?

We've been getting a lot of hits supposedly from AskJeeves such as this:
57 hits this month
Ask Jeeves User Agent
65.214.44.166
Last Visit: 3/20/2007 4:20:54 PM

However this IP does not belong to any of the Ask Jeeves IP ranges as far as I can see:

Ask Jeeves ASKJEEVES-66-09 (NET-4-19-66-0-1) 4.19.66.0 - 4.19.66.255
Ask Jeeves HTW-06853 (NET-64-55-148-1-1) 64.55.148.1 - 64.55.149.254
ASK JEEVES Q0518-63-145-26-32 (NET-63-145-26-32-1) 63.145.26.32 - 63.145.26.63
ASK JEEVES TWTC-SNFO-C-ASKJEEVES-0 (NET-206-80-1-0-1) 206.80.1.0 - 206.80.1.255
ASK JEEVES Q0426-63-236-237-72 (NET-63-236-237-72-1) 63.236.237.72 - 63.236.237.79
ASK JEEVES Q0213-72-165-191-64 (NET-72-165-191-64-1) 72.165.191.64 - 72.165.191.95
ASK JEEVES ASK-JEEV33-211 (NET-12-193-211-0-1) 12.193.211.0 - 12.193.211.255
ASK JEEVES INC Q0321-65-119-214-0 (NET-65-119-214-0-1) 65.119.214.0 - 65.119.214.255
Ask Jeeves PBI-CUSTNET-6751 (NET-216-103-72-40-1) 216.103.72.40 - 216.103.72.47
Ask Jeeves SBCIS-101412-175559 (NET-64-174-153-192-1) 64.174.153.192 - 64.174.153.199
Ask Jeeves SBC067114171064020215 (NET-67-114-171-64-1) 67.114.171.64 - 67.114.171.71
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-209-249-69-0-29 (NET-209-249-69-0-1) 209.249.69.0 - 209.249.69.7
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-208-184-139-0-29 (NET-208-184-139-0-1) 208.184.139.0 - 208.184.139.7
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-208-185-161-0-28 (NET-208-185-161-0-1) 208.185.161.0 - 208.185.161.15
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-208-185-160-0-24 (NET-208-185-160-0-1) 208.185.160.0 - 208.185.160.255
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-208-185-182-128-28 (NET-208-185-182-128-1) 208.185.182.128 - 208.185.182.143
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-216-200-130-0-24 (NET-216-200-130-0-1) 216.200.130.0 - 216.200.130.255
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-208-185-219-224-27 (NET-208-185-219-224-1) 208.185.219.224 - 208.185.219.255
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-64-124-141-0-24 (NET-64-124-141-0-1) 64.124.141.0 - 64.124.141.255
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-209-249-88-48-28 (NET-209-249-88-48-1) 209.249.88.48 - 209.249.88.63
ASK JEEVES MFN-B370-64-124-56-0-24 (NET-64-124-56-0-1) 64.124.56.0 - 64.124.56.255
ASK JEEVES BRW-11672-ASK (NET-216-143-191-128-1) 216.143.191.128 - 216.143.191.191
Ask Jeeves MFN-B370-209-66-103-0-24 (NET-209-66-103-0-1) 209.66.103.0 - 209.66.103.255

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

Stock Price Manipulation

A while back I posed the idea of manipulating stocks somehow using Internet technologies to affect prices and make a profit. Some people scoffed at me and told me how difficult this would be based on how many people would need to be involved to make this happen.

Here's proof that it can be done and something to watch out for:
Internet stock scam

Recently Real Networks has claimed that their stock price was manipulated possibly by hackers or Internet scam artists in China.

So call it a silly idea but there's a reason you've seen all that stock spam in your inbox.

I haven't done the math to see what it would take to get enough people to buy in to affect the price of a stock. I'm sure it depends on the stock and a lot of other factors. Just pondering the possibility.

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Ebay vs. Romanian Hacker

Ebay has been plagued by a Romanian hacker lately per this article:
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2100808,00.asp?kc=EWSTEEMNL030607EOAD

Of interest are the various tactics ebay is using to thwart this criminal which go beyond simple tactics to more complete analysis of hacker activity ...a trend in the industry which has long been needed over an above simple firewall rules and was the reason I started writing this hacker / Internet security / Internet service blog.

More analysis of specific hacker activity by humans, not machines, will help determine traffic and activity patterns to block out attacks better than any firewall rules. It is a constant, on-going effort at mutliple layers from network to firewall to OS to application - it is not a simple one time fix.

Sunday, March 04, 2007

Hacker in Japan

Japan scanning IP addresses for security flaws:

203943 BLOCKED a2ge8iqi9mcec Sun Mar 04 09:24:51 PST 2007 203.143.125.226 //ads/adxmlrpc.php Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98) /ads/adxmlrpc.php 3/4/2007 9:24:51 AM 3/4/2007 9:24:51 AM
203942 BLOCKED 1trlwusqdgvg5 Sun Mar 04 09:24:51 PST 2007 203.143.125.226 //Ads/adxmlrpc.php Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98) /Ads/adxmlrpc.php 3/4/2007 9:24:51 AM 3/4/2007 9:24:51 AM
203941 BLOCKED 4tnft3pc3kubt Sun Mar 04 09:24:50 PST 2007 203.143.125.226 //phpads/adxmlrpc.php Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98) /phpads/adxmlrpc.php 3/4/2007 9:24:51 AM 3/4/2007 9:24:51 AM

..repeat about 50 times

A bunch of IPs requesting stuff we don't host

The following are related hacker IPs probably controlled by a command and control bot:

74.118.71.252
124.50.43.214
60.217.227.135
210.191.147.120
203.165.129.2
210.6.97.244

They all hit our site at the same time requesting things our server does not host.

Here's another set shortly before doing something similar, probably also related to the above:

195.49.188.202
71.63.100.55
210.245.147.241
218.233.57.23272.145.6.47
218.48.127.177

71.63.100.55
210.245.147.241
218.233.57.232

Perhaps someone pointed a domain to the wrong IP since they were all hitting the same domain.

These IPs are all requesting php files -- the favorite language of the hacked and hackers as far as I can tell by the percentage of hacks in the logs on various types of web programming and scripting languages.

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

253-719-0012

AHA...

I figured out what this number is. I got an electronically placed and recorded call from Comcast.

When you put this number in Google however you get a ton of nasty hacker information.

Interesting.

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Defender Technologies, DefenderHost.com - Hacker Source

Hackers have also been pinging our sites from this IP range:

OrgName: Defender Technologies Group, LLC
OrgID: DTGL
Address: 44470 Chilum Place, Building 1
Address: Suite 1197
City: Ashburn
StateProv: VA
PostalCode: 20147
Country: US
NetRange: 69.65.96.0 - 69.65.127.255

Inhoster - bad bot source

This is the latest blatant abusing network:

inetnum: 85.255.112.0 - 85.255.127.255
netname: inhoster
descr: Inhoster hosting company
descr: OOO Inhoster, Poltavskij Shliax 24, Kharkiv, 61000, Ukraine
country: UA

Saturday, February 17, 2007

Related Hacker IPs

Here's a group of related hacker IPs that hit our web sites all at once. All the IPs hit the same web site and it is an odd site for site for these IPs to be hitting:

Time of hack attempt: 2/17/07 21:42:33
65.184.191.13
211.213.118.32
75.34.23.14
212.119.45.138
71.83.46.82
12.206.187.108
59.95.212.177

In addition this IP was in the middle of this looking at another site:
89.150.197.192

Friday, February 16, 2007

Message Guard - Network Solutions

Been writing about trying out Identity Based Encryption - specificall the Message Guard service from Network Solutions provided by Voltage Security.

This is the typical message I get from other people when I try to use Network Solutions Message Guard to send them emails:
_______________

I do not have time to go do all of these steps to read the email. It takes over 5 minutes to complete this. I am the only one here in my department and this is very time consuming. Can you please just send me a regular email.
_______________

Until this is fixed, this is not a viable solution for every day use between two parties that are not both using the same service. I thought the idea was that the person only has to go through the steps one time...

I also asked Voltage Security how they guarantee that someone at their location is not able to decrypt and read the email - what policies and auditing do they have in place - and as of yet no response.

Monday, February 12, 2007

Catepillar, Inc. really Interested in Australia?

It could be legit but this past month alone we've had a huge number of hits from Catepillar, Inc. to a site for an Australian hotel booking system...maybe someone wants to take a trip, or perhaps their server is being used for monitoring unbenknownst to them?

12.2.142.7

Arrival Communications - Hacker

There appears to be a hacker at arrival communications on this IP 69.84.207.35 targeting one of our real estate web sites.
They hit our contact request form about 70 times in one day.
Shortly thereafter the publishing of the site was altered, but we were able to easily republish.

OrgName: Arrival Communication, Inc
OrgID: ARRV
Address: 5100 California Ave Suite 104
City: Bakersfield
StateProv: CA
PostalCode: 93309
Country: US

NetRange: 69.84.192.0 - 69.84.207.255

Identity Based Encryption - Update

As noted in previous posts I'm trying out Identity Based Encryption and having lots of problems with it. A lawyer on comcast can't use it, a customer couldn't access it, people I work with in Australia aren't replying so I am not sure what that meants, someone on AOL couldn't read it. It's a toss up who will be able to read it and who won't. Someone on Yahoo gets it just fine as does someone on SpeakEasy. One mail provider - ElectricMail.com - refuses to let their support staff use it.

The latest is that I just had to re-authenticate to send a message and I'm not sure why. Is this an on-going thing where you have to re-authenticate on a weekly basis?

The other thing to note is that I bought the service from Network Solutions and it is authenticating on the Voltage Security system.

Wednesday, February 07, 2007

Reverse Load Testing

In this article which talks about an attack on the root servers that support the Internet:
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/020707-hackers-slow-internet-root-servers.html?nlhtsec=0205securityalert3&company=

The engineers are "scratching their heads" wondering why the attack was performed.

I can think of a few reasons.

1. Reverse load testing. Hackers are trying to calculate what it will take to bring down the Internet. Bringing down the Internet could cause a myriad of disruptions that might be beneficial to a myriad of sneaky, slimy people.

2. Bringing down the Internet at a particular time when a certain crime is being committed may prevent certain communications which may then alert the authorities or warning systems to the crime underway.

3. Someone wants attention.

4. Some really flawed programming.

5. Mischief.

Tuesday, February 06, 2007

Identity Based Encryption (IBE) - Trial

So far IBE has been mildly usable. Most people were able to get it and login and read the message without any problem.

As supsected a few people were skeptical of the email and didn't want to open it until I called them since it doesn't look like your typical email.

I also had a few people have problems with it including:

#1 my boss couldn't open it on his cell phone - didn't work at all. Also he didn't want to "sign up for an account" even though I explained that's not what it is.

#2 Someone on AOL couldn't open it at all.

#3 One of my customers using Electric Mail and also I think another provider could not open the message. She tried a few different times today...going to have to call tomorrow and see if we can figure this out.

#4 Couldn't respond to tickets to my data center which is a pretty big hosting company. They have an automated system and the message came as an attachment which was then not included in their automated messaging system.

#5 I was told after asking if I could use it on a web server to send messages that it only works in Outlook - after I told them I was using Outlook already so obviously I know that. So you can't sign up for this and then send secure messages in an automated fashion to potential clients, for instance, or email receipts from an e-commerce web site or links to file downloads, etc.

A few things to resolve here...it's not quite as simple as normal email and obviously doesn't work for all scenarios.

Monday, February 05, 2007

PHP: Most Requested URLs by Hackers

Per our records, PHP is far and away the most attacked language - and we don't even host it.

These are the URLS various hackers have been scanning our boxes for in the past few months:

/phpAdsNew/adxmlrpc.php
/index.php
/profile.php
/cmd.php
/Ads/adxmlrpc.php
/register.php
/thisdoesnotexistahaha.php
/stats/cmd.php
/portal/cmd.php
/adserver/adxmlrpc.php
/adxmlrpc.php
/a1b2c3d4e5f6g7h8i9/nonexistentfile.php
/phpads/adxmlrpc.php
/web/e-commerce/database/index.php/administration/module/module/index.php
/portal/cacti/cmd.php
/xmlrpc.php
/xmlrpc/xmlrpc.php
/xmlsrv/xmlrpc.php
/blog/xmlrpc.php
/cacti/cmd.php
/drupal/xmlrpc.php
/web/phpMyAdmin/main.php
/web/phpMyAdmin/main.phpmain.php
/w3c/p3p.xml
/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/author.dll
/admin/login/index.php
/admin/pages/index.php
/admin/pages/settings.php
/admin/start/index.php
/public.php
/web/.../work/index.php
/web//work/index.php

And here are the IPs that have been up to this mischeif along with number of hits:


39 213.186.50.160
25 62.39.119.241
24 208.72.168.27
16 64.208.172.181
12 216.218.196.210
7 206.169.110.66
4 203.121.69.154
3 212.145.93.63
3 81.196.150.45
2 89.110.131.89
2 74.6.74.225
2 72.10.45.38
2 212.8.197.79
2 212.138.64.171
2 125.248.244.131
1 195.175.37.6
1 195.175.37.71
1 200.88.125.9
1 200.88.223.98
1 212.138.64.172
1 212.138.64.175
1 212.138.64.179
1 125.244.164.69
1 62.150.130.26
1 216.129.105.149
1 72.3.139.176
1 72.30.252.98
1 74.6.71.59
1 74.6.72.189
1 74.6.72.225
1 80.95.160.188
1 64.28.23.49
1 82.114.68.194
1 85.214.45.212
1 86.145.147.223

Friday, February 02, 2007

Identity Based Encryption - mail forwarding

This is interesting - I set up an IBE on an email account to test out Identity Based Encryption.

I have one account set up to forward to the other.

I sent from account A to account B.

Then account B forwarded the IBE message to create a key back to account A.

I was able to create the private key on my computer by creating a login - using a different email address than the one the email was sent to. (I was in account A - the one that sent the message).

When I went back to the email in my webmail based email account B I had the key on my machine and was able to read it even though the email address I entered when I created the key for was not the email address the mail was sent to...

Also about 5 minutes later I was forwarded the test message from account B back to account A and was able to read it without doing anything else.

Seems a bit odd. Not sure the implications of this on secure email. I will have to think this one through a bit more.

Tuesday, January 30, 2007

Identity Based Encryption

In a recent post I posted some questions about IBE or Identity Based Encryption for email which some vendors are selling at the moment and suggesting that now their email is encrypted and secure from end to end. On Network Solutions web site they even talk about sending credit cards in email not being secure, thereby implying with IBE that would be secure.

I recently asked Voltage Security about their IBE product to explain some of the problems they would have to overcome to create the encrypted email solution they propose on their web site. Most of their answers sound pretty good, except I still have questions about #5 noted below.

They also sent me a sample message so I could see how their product works. I received a secure message with a graphic button that was blocked by our mail scanning/security products and an attached html file. When I click the button to retrieve the message I have to create a user name and password to read the message and get the private key to read the message. I can see this working for internal organizations but when sending information to potential customers - I can imagine some of them not understanding what this is or being apprehensive about filling something like this out or clicking on an html attachment from a vendor they never heard of or have not worked with before - at least until and unless people get used to this concept. This may be a good solution for internal organizations however, if you trust the vendor of this technology of course and have had your own technical gurus look into the actual details. I am not an encryption expert. I am only looking at the process of getting the mail encrypted from A to B. I cannot say whether the encryption is not decryptable by the company selling it to you, for instance. But here's the scoop on the process:

Once the recipient of an IBE email receives a key they no longer have to get the key for future messages. What happens if they use a different computer?

When a person moves to a different machine, the key is then fetched again from the key server for future and past messages. There is no limit on how many keys one user can fetch as long as they properly authenticate each and every time.

What happens if they log on to web mail on a public computer in an Internet cafe? Is their private key downloaded there for future users of that machine to potentially exploit?

In a public web mail instance, they would be using ZDM, that only caches a stateless cookie that can be set to expire to meet your internal security policies. Also, once an end-user “logs out”, the session cookie is terminated, mitigating any security threat by reading secure email on a public machine. By default, there is a configurable 1 hour session timeout in case the user forgets to logout. Our ZDM cookie security has been fully vetted/tested and is currently in use by several large banks, health organizations and retail companies.

What if someone can steal the private key from the recipient’s machine - since authentication only happens on the first email they could basically read any email after that point if they have the key?

One key is only good for less than 1 week. They would only be able to read secure messages for that one user that fall within that one week session (it’ll most likely be less than half a week). We can utilize any authentication method – email answerback, or one email to prove who you are, is a highly usable, widely used industry standard (see Amazon, Yahoo, Microsoft, banks, etc) but not the most robust authentication standard. We support two-factor authentication, Windows Domain authentication, and different groups of users can be forced to authenticate by different means. The encryption method is tied down to one authentication method, giving you the flexibility to meet your security needs for secure communications.

How does IBE work with email addresses and accounts sending mail from a web server to another address, such as an order receipt?

If you are talking about automated emails, the messages must simply flow through our Voltage SecureMail Gateway, and it will encrypt using the designated recipients individual email address. Nothing special has to happen to encrypt this type of mail flow.

IBE encrypts mail from me to the person I am sending the mail to – what happens when they reply? Is that message sent unencrypted back to me? So if I have my mail encrypted so support people at my mail provider cannot read my outgoing mail, then the customer replies back to me – and my mail is unencrypted coming back from them – so it doesn’t really help? Or…is the mail back encrypted as well even if that person isn’t using IBE?

If they reply to a secure message using our integrated desktop client or ZDM, then you can force the reply or forwarded message to be secure (called “Secure Conversation”). If they don’t ever decrypt the message and simply reply to you, then your message is sent back still in its encrypted form.

My follow up questions to the answer above:

If they do decrypt the message and reply – then is it sent back unencrypted if they are not using IBE themselves or one of your products?

Scenario:
A person comes to our web site and requests product info. We send a secure encrypted message. They are not using any of your products or IBE. They open and read the mail, hit reply and send us back a question. They have outlook or their webmail system set to include the original message in the reply.

Is all our initial information now unencrypted in his reply as it travels back to us? Or once they go through the steps to decrypt the mail are they now using ZDM?

Also what if that ZDM cookie expires? Then when they reply to the message is it sent back unencrypted? Or do they have to log back in each time they read the message to get the cookie?

Hurricane Electric

Hackers live at Hurricane Electric.

I have been writing about hackers at Hurricane Electric since the beginning of this blog and their potential connection with a group of hackers in Alaska. More proof:

Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/thisdoesnotexistahaha.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/portal/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/portal/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/stats/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/thisdoesnotexistahaha.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/thisdoesnotexistahaha.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/portal/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/stats/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/stats/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
Sat Jan 27 21:52:17 PST 2007
216.218.196.210
/cmd.php
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)

Friday, January 26, 2007

Identity-Based Encryption

An interesting new approach to encrypting emails and make sure only the intended recipient can decrypt the email: Identity-Based Encryption.

This works by authenticating the email recipient based on their email address the first time they recieve an email. They are given a key and after that they can read all emails based on that key.

My questions in this case are (still resarching):

- What if someone steals their private key? Can they read all the email?

- What if the person moves to another machine that does not have the private key - will they be unable to read their mail?

- What if someone logs in at an Internet cafe to read webmail - is the email they download encrypted and will they get a new private key? In this case will the private key potentially be stored on the Internet cafe computer for abuse by future users of that machine?

It sounds really good...but will have to try it out to see if it actually works in all reality. I'll let you know... probably some encryption and verification is better than none but not sure how foolproof this is.

Another interesting idea would be to verify that the person downloading the mail to read it is contacting a server defined in the SPF records for that domain, otherwise the server storing the mail for download is not legit. Haven't thought through how this could be implemented nor do I know if this is already part of SPF, to be honest.

Identity Based Encryption

Addendum:
I did some additional research and got answers to these and other questions in this Identity Based Encryption Post: http://randominternet.blogspot.com/2007/01/identity-based-encryption_30.html

Thursday, January 25, 2007

Storing Credit Cards

Tell me one more time why anyone would opt to store credit cards and take on the associated liability?

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2085390,00.asp

There are services that have been in business for years that specialize in keeping this data safe and allow transactions on stored credit card information through PCI compliant mechanisms.

Monday, January 22, 2007

Cybercrime More Profitable than Drugs

I suggested in a recent post that hacking is probably more profitable than selling drugs.

Apparently it is true according to a white paper from MessageLabs.

I warned recently of the need for security in programming frameworks, suggesting that just because you are behind a firewall doesn't make you "safe" from all the world.

This whitepaper also hammers this point home talking about phishing attacks. If someone can weasel one piece of spam through and get one of your 800-20,000 employees to click on the wrong link...they may be able to open the floodgate to all your corporate data.

One recent article I read on top security practices suggests encrypting - everything. Hard drives, databases, etc. Plus you need a good key management system in case someone loses their password or means of encryption and needs to reverse it.

But the point here is - email is the doorway hackers are trying to crack. And just becuase you don't see it - think again. They are pretty sly. Virus programs embedded in malware so the more obvious hacks are wiped clean, monitoring logins so when you login they vamoose, using students at Universities, disguising themselves as harmless but annoying bots...

Here's the white paper regarding the latest email attacks and IT security:

http://reg.itworld.com/servlet/Frs.frs?Context=LOGENTRY&Source=eTEXT0104hm&Source_BC=7&Script=/LP/10011793/reg&code=MSGPSA0122

Sunday, January 21, 2007

Google Imposters

Here are some IPs that recently reported themselves to be Google IP addresses to our server, however looking up those IPs seems like perhaps these are imposters.

64.202.165.132
OrgName: Go Daddy Software
OrgID: GDS-31
Address: 14455 N Hayden Road
Address: Suite 226
City: Scottsdale
StateProv: AZ
PostalCode: 85260
Country: US
NetRange: 64.202.160.0 - 64.202.191.255
CIDR: 64.202.160.0/19
NetName: GO-DADDY-SOFTWARE-INC

72.232.194.66

NetRange: 72.232.0.0 - 72.232.255.255
CIDR: 72.232.0.0/16
NetName: LAYERED-TECH-
NetHandle: NET-72-232-0-0-1
Parent: NET-72-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Allocation
NameServer: NS1.LAYEREDTECH.COM
NameServer: NS2.LAYEREDTECH.COM
Comment: Please send all abuse complaints to
Comment: abuse@layeredtech.com
RegDate: 2005-09-07
Updated: 2006-03-07

72.14.75.44
ISP Alliance, INC. ZCORUM (NET-72-14-64-0-1)
72.14.64.0 - 72.14.127.255
Millry.net MILLRY (NET-72-14-75-0-1)
72.14.75.0 - 72.14.75.255

___________________________

66.102.66.148

OrgName: Cingular Wireless
OrgID: CINW
Address: Cingular Wireless, LLC
Address: 12555 Cingular Way, Suite 4360
City: Alpharetta
StateProv: GA
PostalCode: 30004
Country: US
NetRange: 66.102.160.0 - 66.102.191.255

________________________________

66.102.186.15

OrgID: INKG
Address: 177 Wellington Street
Address: Suite 302
City: Kingston
StateProv: ON
PostalCode: K7L-3E3
Country: CA
NetRange: 66.102.64.0 - 66.102.95.255

__________________________________

217.160.230...

inetnum: 217.160.224.0 - 217.160.239.255

netname: SCHLUND-CUSTOMERSdescr: Schlund + Partner AGcountry: US

Saturday, January 20, 2007

Windows Defender - Cool Feature

[UPDATE: Windows Defender had all the useful functionality removed in Windows 7. So someone will have to write another application to do this all over again so Microsoft can by it for billions of dollars all over again.]

Windows Defender has a feature that is pretty cool. I don't know if they added it recently or I just missed it but it really helps pinpoint the nitty gritty of your network traffic.

If you do a netstat in a command window you can see a bunch of IP addresses and ports and try to figure out which apps are generating which of those lines of traffic - and it is a pain.

Windows Defender has a section that tells you which programs and services are connected to the network, as well as the end point IPs and ports.

For example you can see a program xyz and the local IP is your local ip address connected on port 52345 and the remote IP is IP 72.34.53.232 (randomly picked this out of my head) on port 80 (which you know means you are connected over HTTP probably to a web site but possibly to something else.

Then you can look up those IPs on DNSstuff.com or in the appropriate databases: arin.net, lacnic.net, ripe.net, apnic.net, afric.net to verify that the process claiming to be the Google Toolbar update checker is really going to a Google IP address.

Pretty cool and much needed...if you've been following this blog for the life of it back to the day when I was complaining about this problem with Windows (and reporting it to a guy that I know is in contact with Bill Gates.) Could I have made a difference? Who knows...I am just happy to see it.

What would be even more useful now (maybe it is there) would be to log all this traffic because I have a feeling hackers are monitoring logins and web sites and they know, for instance, when someone is remotely connected to or logged into a machine, when an app has been updated, and then they wait for you to get off and fire up their nasties. So whenever you look on the machine - it's clean. You never see a problem real time.....so that would be the next logical step. I'll have to do some research to see if it's in there already.

Friday, January 19, 2007

Match.com Scam

I have a friend who is always telling me stories about her friend who is on a quest to get married. She's a an attractive doctor. She must be smart as she made it through medical school.
So anyway her latest move was to try match.com. She met this "terrific" guy. He sent her a picture - he was a gorgeous black man - supposedly a model from California now on assignment in Africa. Nigeria, to be exact. Anyone involved in Internet security already knows where I am going with this...

He has this match.com profile which is PERFECT. I like walks on the beach, holding hands, watching the sunset...cuddling. Ahem. Ha! I'm cringing as my friend tells me the story...

Within one week my friend's friend is hooked. She thinks he is "the one" and he says he can tell she is "the one" and doesn't want her to talk to anyone else.

...and then it comes...the story...he has these money orders or something that he can't access and needs her to transfer some money...pretty much anyone up on Internet scams knows the routines...

But she is in love. She tells my friend about it and how she's wired this money etc. and how it showed up. Of course my friend is totally freaking about it and like what the hell - don't do it. But her friend is convinced this is a good guy and sure that he must be in love with her and the bank account is real so...she ends up asking someone else who confirms it is a scam and she tells the guys she knows what is going on. And last night I guess they called her twice.

Well I told them to report all of this to the FBI immediately on the Internet crime link...or should it be the CIA as it is international...or both...my friend says "well she reported it to Match.com and his account was somehow closed..." I urged them to report it with any phone numbers they have, etc.

And then my friend asks - so what can you do about these people in huts in Africa - she says she's seen TV shows where they have computers all lined up...what can we do? It's a government thing. There needs to be an international effort to crack down on this stuff. Everyone knows there are so many Internet scams coming out of Nigeria and ripped off software and stolen goods, and hackers in China doing espianage for the government and the Russian mafia stealing credit cards and hacker organizations like Gulli.com and spammers in Brazil. Everyone knows....but is anyone doing anything about it?

And if a doctor like my friend's friend can fall for such a scam....

Hopefully Match.com has some sort of automated program that analyzes content to look for scammer type material but I am not sure how this works with privacy laws. The least they can do is make a HUGE alert on their web site to anyone signing up for and using their account. Obliviously they are not doing that since this person did not see any such warning - or it needs to be more blatant.

Thursday, January 18, 2007

Preventing Zero Day Attacks

This looks promising. Symantec is using brains instead of a database to figure out if software is malicious or not. Something like this is definitely needed - over and above a database approach. It is too easy to change a file name - let's say if you know xyz.exe is a known hack - the hacker can simply post that file all over the place for the unwary user to download with countless other names. Zero day attacks need more than a known list of hacks because their goal is to get out and do damage in one day - before they get into that database. Also with an FBI representative claiming that 15% of the world's computers are hacked and/or controlled by command and control servers doing dirty work - and new hacked servers coming online every day, it is impossible to block out hackers based on IP address or other identifying information alone.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/011707-symantec-to-use-sonar-to.html?nlhtsec=0115securityalert3&company=BMC

Tuesday, January 16, 2007

Open Resolvers - DNS

Open resolvers seem to be a problem as defined here:

http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/openresolvers.html

I have a new client who is coming from one of the companies on this list of known open resolvers:

http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/openresolvers/ASN-reports/20060923.html

We shall see if and what problems come out of all of this.

Here is some more technical information about open resolvers:
http://condor.depaul.edu/~jkristof/slides/dns-ctinetseminar.pdf

Wednesday, January 03, 2007

Today's blocked IPs

Here are the Ips blocked by our hacker filter:

193.110.140.148
220.181.19.187
38.98.120.70
220.181.19.187
71.13.115.117 (multiple times - reported to network but has not stopped)
220.130.191.239
206.138.130.2
64.229.220.96
88.198.43.39
62.13.25.219
220.181.19.164
216.71.96.94
206.67.139.100
38.98.120.70 (multiple)
38.100.225.5
76.215.57.44